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Threat evidence guide

Sourced incident history, consequence figures, and perimeter-gap context for drone-defense planning. Illustrative scenarios are labeled. No Veil installation is depicted.

What has not happened here yet

A cheap aircraft. An exposed node. Outsized damage.

Aerial approaches need their own assessment. CISA explains that drones can bypass ground perimeter controls and disrupt critical operations. The scenarios below illustrate planning questions, not predictions or reports of attacks. CISA guidance.

Illustrative scenario

Scenario — Substation

An FPV carrying a homemade explosive is flown over a substation fence at night and into a transformer bushing or tank. Damage could disrupt service. Recovery depends on spare availability, network configuration, and repair options. Acquisition lead times are not outage durations. DOE reports that roughly 90% of U.S. electricity passes through a large power transformer at some point.

LPT lead times ~36 mo, up to ~60 (DOE) Purchase cost up to ~$10M (GAO) FPV class ~$200–$1,000 (CSIS)
Illustrative scenario

Scenario — Nuclear power plant support

An FPV targets switchyard equipment, cooling support, or other non-containment assets. For nuclear power plants, the NRC states plant security forces do not have authority to interdict or shoot down aircraft, including drones, flying over their facilities.

Illustrative scenario

Scenario — Refinery or oil depot

An FPV strikes a vulnerable above-ground node—piping, a pump, a tank-farm edge—producing fire, forced shutdown, and supply consequences disproportionate to the cost of the aircraft. History abroad shows how aerial hits on processing capacity move markets.

Illustrative scenario

Scenario — Data center

An FPV disables outdoor generators, fuel systems, or cooling plant. IT loads drop. The Uptime Institute’s 2025 survey reported that 54% of respondents’ most recent significant, serious, or severe outages cost over $100,000, and one in five exceeded $1 million. These are general outage costs, not drone-loss estimates.

Illustrative scenario

Scenario — Hospital generator

An FPV disables the outdoor emergency generator or its fuel supply. Lighting, records, and electricity-dependent medical equipment ride on that last line. Hospitals cannot suspend operations when power fails.

Illustrative — ground perimeter vs. aerial approach. Concept schematic. Not a Veil installation.

The central gap

The fence was never the answer to this.

Most critical sites already invest seriously in perimeter security. Fences. Gates. Cameras. Access control. Armed guards. Those layers are real, and they matter—for the threats they were designed to stop.

They were designed for people and vehicles that arrive on the ground.

  • Fence & razor wireStops climbers and vehicles. Does not stop altitude.
  • Gate & badge controlAn FPV does not badge in at the gate.
  • Armed guard / towerGround security was not budgeted as the primary answer to a low, fast aircraft.

That gap—between a perimeter built for the ground and a threat that uses the air—is the problem Veil exists to help close.

Supporting proof

This is not theoretical. It is already happening—elsewhere.

Overseas campaigns show what the aerial approach looks like when it is exploited. Homeland incidents and federal guidance show the same approach geometry exists here. Brief, sourced history—not the lead of this page.

2019

Abqaiq / Khurais, Saudi Arabia. Aerial attack on energy processing. EIA: Abqaiq alone ~7 million b/d (~7% of global crude oil production capacity); largest single-day Brent/WTI jump in a decade.

2020

Pennsylvania substation drone. Modified commercial UAS recovered near an electric substation. Joint intelligence bulletin (reported publicly) assessed it as the first known U.S. instance of a modified UAS likely intended to target energy infrastructure. No outage; operator not identified.

2022

Moore County, N.C. (fragility proof). Substation shootings—not a drone attack—left tens of thousands without power. Reminder of how fragile a few physical nodes can be.

2023–24

Langley Air Force Base UAS flights; Tower 22. CBS News reported UAS incursions over Langley Air Force Base for 17 nights in December 2023. Langley-Eustis incident reporting. Jan 2024: one-way attack drone struck Tower 22 in Jordan; DoD confirmed three U.S. service members killed.

2025

Spider’s Web; LatAm escalation. Ukraine’s June 2025 FPV operation against Russian strategic aircraft on the ground. CSIS documents sharp rises in explosive drone attacks by criminal and guerrilla groups in Mexico and Colombia. ACLED ranks Myanmar among the world’s most active conflicts for recorded drone events.

Scale of consequence

The aircraft is cheap. The node is not.

Sourced numbers that frame asymmetry. No invented damage totals for hypothetical U.S. FPV attacks.

Large power transformer lead time

DOE Large Power Transformer Resilience Report, July 2024

Common quote~36 months
Maximum reportedup to ~60 months

LPTs typically weigh 150–400 tons. Custom machines. Hard to spare. DOE reports that ~90% of U.S. electricity passes through an LPT at some point.

Cost asymmetry

CSIS (FPV, May 2025); GAO-23-106180 (LPT, Aug 2023)

~$200–$1,000

Average FPV attack-drone cost class cited for the Ukraine conflict, with ~5–15 km typical range.

up to ~$10M

LPT purchase cost reported by utilities to GAO, plus hundreds of thousands to transport—before counting outage impact.

Data-center outage cost

Uptime Institute Annual Outage Analysis 2025

Most recent significant+ outage > $100k54%
Cost more than $1 million20%

Power issues remain a leading cause of serious and severe data-center outages. These survey results are not estimates of drone-related losses.

Citations

Sources

Sources last reviewed November 2026.

  1. CBS News — Langley Air Force Base drone incursions, 17 nights (Dec 2023): cbsnews.com
  2. CSIS — “The Russia-Ukraine Drone War,” May 28, 2025: csis.org
  3. Kyiv Post — combat FPV speeds, Sept. 16, 2024: kyivpost.com
  4. DOE — Large Power Transformer Resilience, July 2024: energy.gov PDF
  5. GAO-23-106180 — Electricity Grid / transformer reserves, Aug. 2023: gao.gov
  6. NERC CIP-014-3 — Physical Security Reliability Standard: nerc.com PDF
  7. NRC — Drones and Nuclear Power Plant Security, Jan. 2025: nrc.gov
  8. EIA — Abqaiq/Khurais outage, Sept. 23, 2019: eia.gov
  9. Uptime Institute — Annual outage analysis 2025: uptimeinstitute.com PDF
  10. FEMA — Healthcare Facilities and Power Outages: fema.gov PDF
  11. CISA — Be Air Aware / protect critical infrastructure: cisa.gov
  12. CISA — UAS Detection Technology Guidance, Aug. 2025: cisa.gov PDF
  13. Reuters — Spider’s Web, June 1, 2025: reuters.com
  14. DoD — Tower 22 release: defense.gov
  15. ACLED — Myanmar drone warfare: acleddata.com
  16. CSIS — Latin America criminal drones: csis.org
  17. CNN — Pennsylvania substation drone / JIB: cnn.com
  18. FBI — Moore County seeking information: fbi.gov
  19. 28 CFR 124.4: ecfr.gov
  20. Federal Register — Counter-UAS authority for SLTT, July 6, 2026: federalregister.gov
  21. Interagency Legal Advisory (FAA host): faa.gov PDF

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